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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates China’s daily foreign exchange intervention through the setting and 
adjustment of the central parity rate, using daily data from July 22, 2005 to July 22, 2013. 
Applying a Bayes Tobit model, we find evidence that China’s daily price intervention 
decision is driven by market developments regarding the Chinese currency, international 
currency movements and macroeconomic conditions. The results further suggest that the 
objectives of China’s daily price intervention change not only over time, but also between 
high and low interventions. 
JEL classification: C34; E58; F31 
Keywords: Foreign exchange intervention; Exchange rate policy; China；Tobit models; 
Gibbs sampling 
He Li
ab
 Zhichao Zhang
ab
* Chuanjie Zhang
ab
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Daily intervention is applied by some monetary authorities, such as Germany 
(Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1994 and 1996), Russia (Tullio and Natarov, 1999) and 
Pakistan (Shah et al., 2009), in the most of trading days. China is also the country which 
applies the intervention in the most of trading days. Official daily intervention in the foreign 
exchange market has been a distinctive feature of China’s exchange rate policy. As in other 
emerging market economies, the primary motivation of China’s daily intervention is to align 
the exchange rate to fundamentals as suggested in the 1985 Plaza Accord (Baillie and 
Osterberg, 1997), and to stabilize the disorderly foreign exchange market (Szakmary and 
Mathur, 1997; Disyatat and Galati, 2007; Pontines and Rajan, 2011). However, despite its 
critical importance, little is understood about the country’s intervention operation. This 
hampers keeping China’s exchange rate policy and its global repercussions in perspective, 
and hence calls for research attention.  
In the new managed floating rate regime, the central parity rate plays a key role. On 
every business day, this rate is published by the authorities before the market opening. It then 
remains valid for the day and all market transactions are based upon it. This rate also 
provides an anchor for the system. In addition, the central parity rate is a policy indicator. In 
the process of setting the parity rate, the central bank takes into account current and expected 
economic conditions. Through setting the parity rate at different levels, the central bank may 
affect the benchmark for transactions in the marketplace, anchoring stability of the Chinese 
foreign exchange market and transmitting policy signals to market participants.  
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This study is motivated to examine China’s intervention in the central parity rate (the 
Daily Price intervention) because of its primary importance in the nation’s intervention nexus; 
such research will help to achieve a better understanding of China’s exchange rate policy, 
which is increasingly exhibiting global influences. To this end, the first important dimension 
concerns understanding the determinants of such intervention. The first challenge is to model 
a reaction function based on a non-linear relationship, because intervention in the central 
parity rate does not increase or decrease in approximately the same magnitude. Literature has 
shown that Tobit models are appropriate when the research interest lies in the magnitude of 
intervention rather than the probability (Humpage, 1999; Brandner and Grech, 2005). 
However, given the fact that threshold varies depending on individual characteristics (Omori 
and Miyawaki, 2010; Nakayama et al., 2010), we combine the Tobit analysis with covariate 
dependent thresholds. This paper begins by using the Bayes Tobit model as the reaction 
function. 
The work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we develop a Daily 
Intervention Index that is constructed by comparing the daily central parity rate to the fair 
value CNY/USD rate in the IFV approach. Analysis based on this index, the current research 
unearths evidence on how the foundation of China’s exchange rate regime, i.e. the parity 
exchange rate is managed by the authorities. This sheds critical lights on the properties and 
frequency of Chinese official intervention and hence helps promote a better understanding of 
the Chinese exchange rate policy which has growing global importance.   
Then, the findings by this research confirms the significant effects of three 
determinants underlying the process of China’s setting of the central parity rate reveals the 
true nature of the Chinese exchange rate regime. These three determining factors include the 
RMB price in previous trading sessions (proxied by the market makers’ offer rate), 
international currency movements (proxied by the Broad Dollar Index compiled by 
4 
 
America’s Federal Reserves) and macro conditions of the economic environment (proxied by 
the yield curve spread between China and the USA). For practical purposes, with knowledge 
of these factors international investors and policy observers in the Chinese financial market 
can gauge possible changes and their future trend of China’s central parity as the benchmark 
exchange rate changes.  Finally, for the traders who are involved in China currency business, 
a better understanding of how and when China’s intervention operations may happen can 
help them design a better informed trading strategy. 
In terms of policy implications, this research shows that China’s intervention can be 
effective under some conditions. This means that it is possible for the Chinese government to 
operate a middle way between the free floating and the fixed exchange rate system. In turn, 
China to some extent can manage to mitigate the effects of the monetary policy trilemma.  
This is important to understand fundamental policy development in China.  
The results from the Bayes Tobit models show that, generally, these factors have 
significant effects on China’s Daily Price intervention in the whole sample. Results for the 
whole sample suggest that China follows a leaning-against-the-wind policy, and conditions of 
domestic economy and foreign market can impact Daily Price intervention. Furthermore, 
coefficients on the determinants are found to be time-varying across different subsamples, 
and between high and low intervention. The evidence indicates that China’s Daily Price 
intervention has multi-facets. With regard to high intervention, the policy objective during all 
the subsample time periods relates to market exchange rate condition. For low intervention, 
the policy objective ranges from restraining the domestic economy from overheating before 
the financial crisis, to a focus on market exchange rate conditions during and after the 
financial crisis. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes measurement of 
China’s Daily Price intervention and the data deployed in the study. Section 3 estimates the 
Bayes Tobit models. Section 4 reports the estimation results. Section 5 presents the main 
findings of the study. 
 
2. Data Description 
2.1. Forms and Measures of Foreign Exchange Intervention 
2.1.1. Forms of China’s intervention 
From an operational standpoint, there are three major ways in which the Chinese 
monetary authorities may intervene in the foreign exchange market: 
(1) The central bank (CB) intervenes by directly selling or purchasing foreign currencies 
in the marketplace. In the case of purchase intervention, the central bank trades 
foreign currencies with central bank notes; in selling intervention, it pours foreign 
reserves into the market. We term this type of intervention ‘quantity intervention’; it 
is also called CB intervention, as it involves the central bank participating in market 
transactions. Only rarely would the Chinese monetary authorities intervene through 
adjusting the interest rate or changing commercial banks’ required reserve rate. 
(2) The central bank controls the level and growth of the RMB exchange rate by 
specifying the central parity rate (CPR) and the range around which the daily trading 
prices are allowed to fluctuate. We call this ‘daily price intervention’, since this 
intervention operation involves the setting and adjustment of the central parity.  
(3) Intervention may also take an oral form, including policy briefing, moral persuasion, 
formal and informal meetings, and telephone conversations. We call this ‘Oral 
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intervention’. It is straightforward for the Chinese central bank to effectuate this form 
of intervention by instructing or directing the attention of the state-owned banks 
towards ‘things to note’, which are dominant forces in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market.   
Of the three forms of Chinese official intervention, this paper concentrates on the 
Daily Price intervention, due to data availability
1
. 
 
2.1.2 Development of the central parity rate 
Table 1 shows the process of the development of the central parity rate. The managed 
float system started on 21
st
 July 2005 (PBOC, 2005). From that date the RMB exchange rate 
was not simply pegged to the US dollar, and so could better reflect market conditions. On 
29
th
 December 2005, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) authorized 13 
banks to launch the market maker service (SAFE, 2005). Now there are 35 market makers 
(SAFE, 2016). Before 4
th
 January 2006, the central parity rate was set by the closing price 
exchange rate of the previous day. However, with the introduction of the OTC transaction, 
the PBOC changed the formation of the central parity rate (PBOC, 2006). In this system, the 
China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) asks the exchange rate prices from the 
market makers before the opening time of the foreign exchange market, and these exchange 
rate prices are used as the calculation sample of the central parity rate. Then, after deleting 
the highest and the lowest price, the weighted average of these exchange rate prices is 
calculated. The weighted average price is the central parity rate. The weights are based on the 
trading volume of market makers and the conditions of exchange rate prices. From Table 1, 
we can see that the PBOC has tended to increase the width of the exchange rate band. The 
                                                          
1
 Even in the advanced countries, such as US or Japan, the exact time of a foreign exchange intervention is 
unavailable (Kitamura, 2016). 
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band has increased three times: on 21
st
 May 2007 (PBOC, 2007), 16
th
 April 2012 (PBOC, 
2012), and 17
th
 March 2014 (PBOC, 2014). This serves the PBOC’s purpose, which is to 
increase the elasticity of the RMB exchange rate. 
 
Table 1 
Developments of China’s central parity rate policy. 
Date Event 
21/07/2005 Launch of the managed float system with reference to a basket of currencies 
29/12/2005 13 banks become the market makers 
04/01/2006 Central parity rate combines OTC transactions and negotiation 
21/05/2007 Exchange rate band changes from 0.3% to 0.5% 
16/04/2012 Exchange rate band changes from 0.5% to 1% 
17/03/2014 Exchange rate band changes from 1% to 2% 
 
The daily central parity is published by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System 
(CFETS) at 9:15; this is fifteen minutes before the start of the foreign exchange opening 
hours, which run from 9:30 to 15:30 Beijing time. The price-setting process for the central 
parity considers three functions (CFETS, 2013): the prices of central parity of all foreign 
exchange market makers asked by CFETS before the opening time; the changes in foreign 
exchange market conditions; and China’s macro economy condition. As proxies for these 
three functions we use CNY/USD exchange rate offers from foreign exchange market makers, 
broad currency index, and the yield curve spread, respectively. Therefore, this research tests 
whether or not CNY/USD exchange rate offers, broad currency index and the yield curve 
spread are determinant factors of Daily Price intervention. 
Two evidences used central parity rate to intervene RMB exchange rate movements. 
First, some Chinese literature argues that the PBOC controls RMB exchange rate through the 
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central parity rate. For example, Zhao et al. (2012) indicate that if the PBOC never loses 
control of the central parity rate, then the RMB exchange rate must follow the will of the 
PBOC. In addition, Zhao et al. (2013) and Shen (2013) also argue that RMB exchange rate is 
controlled by the PBOC, as the PBOC decides the central parity rate. Secondly, news reports 
might also provide proof that the central parity rate can influence RMB exchange rate 
movement. For example, according to reports in The Wall Street Journal, the RMB exchange 
rate followed the guidance of the central parity rate on 12/09/2014, 16/09/2014, and 
08/10/2014. However, the literature in English includes very little on Daily Price intervention. 
This chapter tries to fill this critical void. 
 
2.1.3. Measuring China’s daily price intervention 
This research constructs a Daily Price intervention ratio by comparing the CPR with 
the fair value CNY/USD exchange rate estimated by the indirect fair value (IFV) approach. 
From the fair value exchange rate, we can find out at what level the exchange rate should be. 
Over the years, a number of models of currency fair value have been developed. 
Financial markets have developed formulas and models to derive fair values for futures, 
bonds, options, swaps and other securities (Aries et al., 2006). Empirical estimations make 
extensive use of purchasing power parity (PPP) (Officer, 1976), Pen effect (Summers and 
Heston, 1991), fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) (Williamson, 1983 and 1994), 
behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) (Clark and MacDonald, 1999) and indirect 
fair value (IFV) (Cenedese and Stolper, 2012) to measure exchange rate misalignment. IFV 
estimates are based on the assumption that speculative activity is the principal cause of 
misaligned exchange rates (Cenedese and Stolper, 2012). In comparison with PPP, Pen effect, 
FEER and BEER, the IFV has some advantages: First, only IFV can focus on daily financial 
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and macro data, while the other models have to use quarterly or yearly data (Zhang, 2012). 
Second, the fair value does not require restrictive assumptions on financial market 
equilibrium to be operational (Clarida, 2013). Third, the IFV model benefits from ease of 
operability. Like the BEER model, IFV is estimated using co-integration techniques. To our 
knowledge, this IFV approach has not been previously formalized in the academic literature. 
The IFV approach is based on the assumption that misaligned exchange rates are 
caused by speculative activity (Lyons, 2001). The following equation can express the relation 
between the exchange rate level and the speculative positioning: 
 𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑍𝑡 + 𝜃
′𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                (1) 
where 𝑒𝑡 is the spot exchange rate observed in the FX market, 𝑍𝑡 is a vector of broadly 
defined fundamentals, 𝑆𝑡 is speculative activity variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is a residual error. 
Depending on equation (1), it is possible to use the parameter estimates to calculate 
fair value in the following equation: 
?̅?𝑡 = ?̂?
′𝑍𝑡 + 𝜃
′𝑆̅                                                                                                           (2) 
with the overbar denoting the value of S that is neutral speculative positioning. In most cases 
the choice of neutral speculative positioning is the sample mean. 
If the CPR is contrary to the prediction of the market, and is 1% (0.3% during the 
period 22
nd
 July 2005 to 21
st
 May 2007; 0.5% before 16
th
 April 2012), that is, 100% of the 
horizontal band, above/below the benchmark, it is marked as Daily Price intervention. The 
ratio of Daily Price intervention is estimated as follows: 
 𝐼𝑡 =
𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝐹𝑉𝑡
                                                                                                                      (3) 
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where 𝐼𝑡 is the Daily Price intervention index, 𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑡 is the present central parity rate, and 
𝐹𝑉𝑡−1 is the fair value RMB exchange rate estimated by the IFV approach at day t. High 
intervention (depreciates the Chinese yuan) means the CPR is 100% higher than the 
benchmark, but if the Daily Price intervention ratio is 100% lower than the benchmark, it is 
termed low intervention (appreciates the Chinese yuan); otherwise there is no intervention. 
This means high intervention is larger than 1, and low intervention is smaller than 1. 
For example, on 30/04/2009, the fair value exchange rate was 6.98, but the CPR was 
6.83; this is interpreted as an appreciation of the RMB with intervention by the PBOC. 
Therefore, this date is marked as low intervention. On 03/02/2011, the markets considered the 
RMB fair value exchange rate should be 6.51, but the PBOC set the CPR at 6.59, indicating a 
depreciation of the RMB. Accordingly, this date is marked as high intervention. 
 
2.2 Data Description 
2.2.1 The dataset 
The dataset analysed in this study contains daily intervention over an 8-year period 
starting on 22
nd
 July 2005 and ending on 22
nd
 July 2013, which represents a total of 2087 
trading days excluding official holidays. To further understand the determinants of China’s 
intervention, we additionally divide the whole sample into three subsamples: 15
th
 July 2008 
and 23
rd
 June 2010 are two time points. From Figure 1, it can be seen that the movements of 
the RMB exchange rate were flat during the period from 15
th
 July 2008 to 23
rd
 June 2010, 
when, in response to the global financial crisis, China re-pegged its currency. We also use the 
supγ(F(γ)) test (Andrews, 1993) to confirm that the structural break dates are 15
th
 July 2008 
and 23
rd
 June 2010. Based on the Andrews (1993), the variable contained in the supγ(F(γ)) 
test should no unit root. Table 3 shows that there is no unit root in RMB exchange rate based 
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on the ADF and PP tests. The F-statistic at each break candidate (γ) can be obtained by the 
standard Chow test. From Figure 2 we find that the largest (4.86) F-statistic is in July 2008. 
While the second largest (3.63) F-statistic is in September 2010, we still choose June 2010 
(2.73), because it was in that month that the PBOC announced the change of China’s 
exchange rate regime from a peg to a managed float. We reject the null hypothesis, which is 
that there is no break, at 5% significance. Therefore, 15
th
 July 2008 and 23
rd
 June 2010 are 
the structural break dates. Figure 3 presents the time series of daily intervention index. 
 
Fig. 1. Movements of CNY/USD exchange rate.  
 
Table 3 
ADF and PP tests 
Methods t-Statistic 
ADF -3.423*** 
PP -4.574*** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level; the null hypotheses for ADF and PP tests is that the 
variable follows a unit root process.  
6.0
6.4
6.8
7.2
7.6
8.0
8.4
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Fig. 2. Regime breaks in the RMB exchange rate (2005-2013). 
 
1.00
1.04
1.08
1.12
1.16
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Fig. 3. Daily CPR intervention index in Chinese foreign exchange market during 2005-2013. 
Note: High intervention is larger than 1; low intervention is smaller than 1. 
 
2.2.2 Determining factors 
CNY/USD exchange rate offers. Similar to the London Gold Fix and European 
Currency Unit (ECU) concertation procedure, the RMB exchange rate central parity process 
involves CNY/USD exchange rate offers from foreign exchange market makers. Because the 
Critical value 5%
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Testing for breaks in RMB exchange rate (2005-2013)
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price of central parity provided by different makers is confidential, the makers’ RMB 
exchange rate offer is the best proxy for central parity price. Data on exchange rate prices is 
available for only 6 banks, and we cannot know the weights. In addition, we use the 
CNY/USD exchange rate in the US market to be the proxy for foreign banks’ offers. The 
offers from foreign banks are less controlled by the Chinese government and should follow 
the exchange rate in the US foreign exchange market. Moreover, although we do not know 
the weights, we know that the Bank of China occupies the greatest weight, as the majority of 
foreign reserves are in the Bank of China. Therefore, this research first uses the average mean 
of the 5 banks’ exchange rate prices and exchange rate in the US market, and then sums the 
exchange rate price from the Bank of China to be the price of central parity from foreign 
exchange market makers. The equation for CNY/USD exchange rate offers is as follows: 
𝐸𝑅𝑂 = 60%𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐵𝐶 + 40%𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑀  
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑀 = 𝐸𝑅 − 𝐸𝑅𝑂                                                                                                   (4) 
where ERO is the CNY/USD exchange rate offers, EROBC is the exchange rate offer from 
the Bank of China, and EROM is the average mean of the 5 banks’ exchange rate prices and 
exchange rate in the US market. In addition, EROM is the exchange rate offers deviation, 
equalling RMB exchange rate minus exchange rate offers.  
Broad currency index. Unlike the London Gold Fix and the ECU concertation 
procedure, China’s central parity also considers the changes in foreign exchange market 
conditions. We use broad currency index as the proxy for foreign exchange market condition. 
The broad currency index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the US 
dollar against the currencies of a large group of major US trading partners, including China. 
It is an appropriate measure for the foreign exchange market condition, as we can use it to get 
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the situations of the basket currencies relevant to the RMB exchange rate movement.
2
 The 
change of broad currency index is estimated as follows: 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1                                                                                        (5) 
where 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 is the change of broad currency index, which is calculated by broad currency 
index on day t minus index on day t-1. Poor foreign exchange market condition would trigger 
Daily Price intervention by the PBOC. Therefore, we assume that the relation between the 
Daily Price intervention and the change of broad currency index should be negative. 
The yield curve spread. The PBOC also needs to consider the condition of China’s 
macro economy. The yield curve spread is a proxy for China’s macroeconomic condition. 
Based on studies by Harvey (1988), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and Rudebusch and 
Williams (2009), it can play a useful role in macroeconomic prediction. The yield curve 
spread used in this research is the 10-year government bond yield minus the 12-month 
government bond yield, gained through the following equation: 
𝑌𝐶𝑡 = 10𝑌𝐺𝐵𝑡 − 1𝑌𝐺𝐵𝑡                                                                                             (6) 
where 𝑌𝐶𝑡  is the yield curve spread, 10𝑌𝐺𝐵𝑡  is the 10-year government bond yield, and 
1𝑌𝐺𝐵𝑡 is the 12-month government bond yield. The relation between the yield curve and the 
economy should be positive (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). From Figure 4, we can see that the 
yield curve has co-movement with the GDP growth. 
 
                                                          
2
 On 28
th
 January 2011, PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan stated that the RMB exchange rate refers to a basket 
of almost 20 currencies (PBOC, 2011). 
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Fig. 4. China’s GDP and yield curve. 
 
3. Tobit Model with Covariate Dependent Thresholds 
The Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds is a development of the standard 
Tobit model. Although Tobit models can overcome the problem whereby the dependent 
variable takes a value of zero most of the time, the coefficients cannot be estimated when the 
deterministic thresholds
3
 can vary with individuals depending on their characteristics (Omori 
and Miyawaki, 2010; Nakayama et al., 2010). In such a model with covariate dependent 
thresholds, the 𝑖th response variable 𝑦𝑖 is observed if it is greater than or equal to a threshold 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿 where 𝑤𝑖
′ and 𝛿 are a 𝐽 × 1 covariate vector and a corresponding coefficient vector, 
respectively. The vector 𝑤𝑖
′ consists of the covariates that impact the decision whether to 
engage in Daily Price intervention. Using a Bayesian approach, we describe a Gibbs sampler 
algorithm to estimate parameters. 
First, we describe a Gibbs sampler for a standard Tobit model (Chib, 1995). The prior 
distributions of (𝛼, 𝜏2) are assumed to be a conditionally multivariate normal distribution and 
an inverse gamma distribution, respectively: 
                                                          
3
 Threshold is quite often used to check the effects of monetary policies in the different levels (Aleem and 
Lahiani, 2014; Chkili and Nguyen, 2014)  
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𝛼|𝜏2~𝑁(𝛼0, 𝜏
2𝐴0), 𝜏
2~ lg (
𝑛0
2
,
𝑆0
2
),                                                                          (10) 
where 𝛼0 is a 𝐾 × 1 known constant vector, 𝐴0 is a 𝐾 × 𝐾 known constant matrix, and 𝑛0, 𝑆0 
are known positive constants. To implement a Markov chain Monte Carlo method, we use a 
data augmentation method by sampling an unobserved latent response variable 𝑦𝑖
∗. Using 𝑦∗, 
standard Tobit model reduces to an ordinary linear regression model, 𝑦∗ = 𝑋𝛼 + 𝜖, where 
𝑦∗ = (𝑦1
∗, 𝑦2
∗, … , 𝑦𝑛
∗)′, 𝑋′ = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) and 𝜖 = (𝜖1, 𝜖2, … , 𝜖𝑛)
′~𝑁(0, 𝜏2𝐼𝑛). Given 𝑦
∗, the 
conditional posterior distributions of (𝛼, 𝜏2) are 
𝛼|𝜏2, 𝑦∗~𝑁(𝑎1, 𝜏
2𝐴1),    𝜏
2~ lg (
𝑛1
2
,
𝑆1
2
),                                                                   (11) 
where 𝐴1
−1 = 𝐴0
−1 + 𝑋′𝑋, 𝑎1 = 𝐴1(𝐴0
−1𝑎0 + 𝑋
′𝑦∗), 𝑛1 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛, and 𝑆1 = 𝑦
∗′𝑦∗ +
𝑎0
′ 𝐴0
−1𝑎0 + 𝑆0 − 𝑎1
′ 𝐴1
−1𝑎1. Let 𝑦0 = (𝑦0,1, 𝑦0,2, … , 𝑦0,𝑚)
′ and 𝑦𝑐
∗ = (𝑦𝑐,1
∗ , 𝑦𝑐,2
∗ , … , 𝑦𝑐,𝑛−𝑚
∗ )′ 
denote 𝑚 × 1 and (𝑛 − 𝑚) × 1 vectors of observed (uncensored) and censored dependent 
variables, respectively. Then, we can sample from the posterior distribution using a Gibbs 
sampler: 
(1) Initialize 𝛼 and 𝜏2. 
(2) Sample 𝑦𝑐
∗|𝛼, 𝜏2~𝑇𝑁(−∞,𝑑)(𝑥𝑖
′𝛼, 𝜏2), 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 − 𝑚, for censored observations, 
where 𝑇𝑁(𝑎,𝑏)(𝜇, 𝜎
2) denotes a normal distribution 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2) truncated on the interval 
(𝑎, 𝑏). 
(3) Sample (𝛼, 𝜏2)|𝑦𝑐
∗, 𝑦0 
(a) Sample 𝜏2|𝑦𝑐
∗, 𝑦0~lg (𝑛1 2⁄ , 𝑆1 2⁄ ), 
(b) Sample 𝛼|𝜏2, 𝑦𝑐
∗, 𝑦0~𝑁(𝑎1, 𝜏
2𝐴1). 
(4) Go to 2. 
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Next, we extend the above sampler by adding another step, whereby we can derive the 
Gibbs sampler for the Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds. The threshold In the 
standard Tobit model is assumed to be known and a constant. However, it is usually unknown 
and may vary with the individual characteristics. Thus we extend it to allow unknown but 
covariate dependent thresholds as follows: 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑡
′𝑏 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑡
′𝑏 + 𝜀𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡
∗ ≥ 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿, 
𝑦𝑡 = 0      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡
∗ < 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿.                                                                                              (12) 
where (𝑤𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) are 𝐽 × 1 and 𝐾 × 1 covariate vectors and (𝛿, 𝛼) are corresponding 𝐽 × 1 and 
𝐾 × 1 regression coefficient vectors. The known constant threshold 𝑑 in (26) and (27) is 
replaced by the unknown but covariate dependent threshold, 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿. 
To conduct a Bayesian analysis of the proposed Tobit model (12), we assume that 
prior distributions of (𝛼, 𝜏2) are given by (11). A prior distribution of 𝛿 is assumed to be 
𝛿|𝜏2~𝑁(𝑑0, 𝜏
2𝐷0), since we often use independent variables for 𝑤𝑖’s similar to those for 𝑥𝑖’s, 
and the magnitude of the dispersion is expected to be similar. If there is little prior 
information with respect to 𝛿, we take large values for the diagonal elements of 𝐷0, which 
will result in a fairly flat prior for 𝛿. 
𝛼|𝛿, 𝜏2, 𝑦∗~𝑁(𝑎1, 𝜏
2𝐴1),    𝜏
2|𝛿, 𝛼, 𝑦∗~ lg (
𝑛1
2
,
𝑆1
2
), 
𝛿|𝛼, 𝜏2, 𝑦∗~𝑇𝑁𝑅0 ⋂ 𝑅𝑐(𝑑0, 𝜏
2𝐷0),                                                                               (13) 
where 𝑛1 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛 + 𝐽, 𝑆1 = 𝑦
∗′𝑦∗ + 𝑎0
′ 𝐴0
−1𝑎0 − 𝑎1
′ 𝐴1
−1𝑎1 + 𝑆0 + (𝛿 − 𝑑0)
′𝐷0
−1(𝛿 −
𝑑0), 𝐴1
−1 = 𝐴0
−1 + 𝑋′𝑋, 𝑎1 = 𝐴1(𝐴0
−1𝑎0 + 𝑋
′𝑦∗), 𝑅0 =
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{𝛿|𝑤𝑖
′𝛿 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖}, 𝑅𝑐 = {𝛿|𝑤𝑖
′𝛿 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖}. The Gibbs sampler is 
implemented in three blocks as follows: 
(1) Initialize 𝛿, 𝛼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏2 where 𝛿 ∈ 𝑅0. 
(2) Sample 𝑦𝑐
∗|𝛼, 𝜏2, 𝛿, 𝑦0. Generate 𝑦𝑐,𝑖
∗ |𝛿, 𝛼, 𝜏2~𝑇𝑁(−∞,𝑤𝑖
′𝛿)(𝑥𝑖
′𝛼, 𝜏2), 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 − 𝑚, 
for censored observations. 
(3) Sample (𝛼, 𝜏2)|𝛿, 𝑦𝑐
∗, 𝑦0 
(a) Sample 𝜏2|𝛿, 𝑦𝑐
∗, 𝑦0~lg (𝑛1 2⁄ , 𝑆1 2⁄ ), 
(b) Sample 𝛼|𝜏2, 𝛿, 𝑦𝑐
∗, 𝑦0~𝑁(𝑎1, 𝜏
2𝐴1). 
(4) Sample 𝛿|𝛼, 𝜏2, 𝑦∗~𝑇𝑁𝑅0 ⋂ 𝑅𝑐(𝑑0, 𝜏
2𝐷0). 
(5) Go to 2. 
Steps 2 and 3 are similar to those in the simple Tobit model. To sample from the 
conditional posterior distribution of 𝛿 in Step 4, we generate one component 𝛿𝑗 of 𝛿 =
(𝛿1, 𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑗)
′ at a time, given other components 𝛿−𝑗 = (𝛿1, … , 𝛿𝑗−1, 𝛿𝑗+1 … , 𝛿𝐽)
′. Since 𝛿 
should lie in the region 𝑅0 ⋂ 𝑅𝑐, the 𝛿𝑗 is subject to the constant 𝐿𝑗 ≤ 𝛿𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑗 where 𝑤𝑖,−𝑗 =
(𝑤𝑖1, … , 𝑤𝑖𝑗−1, 𝑤𝑖𝑗+1, … , 𝑤𝑖𝐽)
′, 
𝐿𝑗 = max
𝑖
𝐿𝑖𝑗 ,    𝐿𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑤𝑖𝑗
−1(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖,−𝑗
′ 𝛿−𝑗)   𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑗 < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖,
𝑤𝑖𝑗
−1(𝑦𝑖
∗ − 𝑤𝑖,−𝑗
′ 𝛿−𝑗)   𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑗 > 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖,
−∞,    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
 
𝐿𝑗 = min𝑖 𝑈𝑖𝑗 ,    𝑈𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑤𝑖𝑗
−1(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖,−𝑗
′ 𝛿−𝑗)   𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑗 < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖,
𝑤𝑖𝑗
−1(𝑦𝑖
∗ − 𝑤𝑖,−𝑗
′ 𝛿−𝑗)   𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑗 > 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖,
−∞,    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
        (14) 
Let 𝑑0,−𝑗 = (𝑑01, … , 𝑑0,𝑗−1, 𝑑0,𝑗+1, … , 𝑑0𝐽)
′ and let 𝐷0,𝑗,𝑗, 𝐷0,𝑗,−𝑗 and 𝐷0,−𝑗,−𝑗 denote a 
prior variance of 𝛿𝑗, for 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽, using the conditional truncated normal posterior 
distribution, 
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𝛿𝑗|𝛿−𝑗, 𝛼, 𝜏
2, 𝑦∗~𝑇𝑁(𝐿𝑗,𝑈𝑗)(𝑚𝑗 , 𝑠𝑗
2𝜏2), 
𝑚𝑗 = 𝑑0𝑗 + 𝐷0,𝑗,−𝑗𝐷0,−𝑗,−𝑗
−1 (𝛿−𝑗 − 𝑑0,−𝑗), 
𝑠𝑗
2 = 𝐷0,𝑗,𝑗 − 𝐷0,𝑗,−𝑗𝐷0,−𝑗,−𝑗
−1 𝐷0,𝑗,−𝑗
′ .                                                                           (15) 
Note that this reduces to 𝑇𝑁(𝐿𝑗,𝑈𝑗)(𝑑0𝑗, 𝜏
2𝐷0,𝑗,𝑗) for a diagonal 𝐷0. 
We estimate a Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds to test whether the 
three factors (CNY/USD exchange rate bank offers, broad currency index and the yield curve) 
could be the determinants of China’s Daily Price intervention: 
𝐼𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑡
′𝑏 + 𝜀𝑡, 𝐼𝑡
ℎ = 𝐼𝑡
∗   𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑡
∗ > 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑡
ℎ = 0  𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿, 
Or 
𝐼𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑡
′𝑏 + 𝜀𝑡, 𝐼𝑡
𝑙 = 𝐼𝑡
∗   𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑡
∗ < 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑡
𝑙 = 0  𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑡
∗ ≥ 𝑤𝑖
′𝛿, 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥𝑡
′𝑏 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑌𝐶𝑡 
𝜀𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡
2),                                                                                                     (16) 
where 𝐼𝑡
∗is the latent variable; 𝐼𝑡
ℎ (𝐼𝑡
𝑙) is the observed censored value of high (low) 
intervention; 𝑥𝑡
′ is the vector of exogenous explanatory variables at time t; 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the 
CNY/USD exchange rate offers deviation; 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 means the broad currency index; 𝑌𝐶𝑡 is the 
yield curve between the 10-year and the 12-month China government bond yields.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Fair Value RMB Exchange Rate 
Following the IFV approach, we estimate the fair value for the RMB exchange rate. 
The 𝑍𝑡 is the difference between US and Chinese 2-year swap rates, as well as linear, 
quadratic and cubic time trends. We use 1-month 25-delta risk reversals as a measure of 
speculative positioning in the regression (1). Before cointegration analysis, it is necessary to 
test unit roots in the time series in order to avoid spurious regression (Wang et al., 2007). 
Table 6 shows the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. We find evidence that risk 
reversals are stationary, while the exchange rate and interest rate differential show a unit root. 
In fact, Figure 5 shows that risk reversals behave as a stationary time series with a sample 
mean, which is very close, but not equal, to zero. 
 
Table 6 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for the IFV model. 
ADF test 𝐸𝑅 𝑍 𝑆 
t-Statistic -0.524 -2.540 -4.148*** 
Note: *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Fig. 5. China’s risk reversals. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the results. The green line is the observed daily RMB exchange 
rate. The red line represents the fitted value of the regression using the raw data of all 
variables. Finally, the blue line displays the fair value exchange rate, which the exchange rate 
would have been without the impact of speculative activity. We use equation (2) to get the 
fair value, that is, as the fitted exchange rate but using the sample mean of the risk reversals 
instead of the observed values. 
 
Fig. 6. Movements of Renminbi’s fair value, fitted value and realised value. 
 
4.2 Results for the Whole Sample Period 
Table 7 presents the results for the whole sample period tested using the Tobit model 
with covariate dependent thresholds. In the models for the subsample periods, the initial 
1,000 variates are discarded as the burn-in period and the subsequent 30,000 values are 
recorded to conduct an inference. The number of Daily Price interventions in the whole 
sample is 1515, among which 43.6% of high interventions and 29% of low interventions are 
censored. Like Daily intervention by the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve (Almekinders and 
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Eijffinger, 1994 and 1996), China’s Daily Price intervention happened on more than half of 
all trading days. 
The estimates do not reject the hypothesis that the PBOC followed a leaning-against-
the-wind policy by reverting to its bank exchange rate offers. The 95% intervals for bank 
exchange rate offer variables do not include zero, which means coefficients are significant at 
5% level. The coefficient on bank exchange rate offers 𝑏1 is negative (positive) and 
significant for high (low) intervention in the Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds, 
which means that when the exchange rate offers appreciate (depreciate), the PBOC sets a 
higher (lower) central parity rate to reverse this appreciation (depreciation). This gives 
empirical evidence for the leaning-against-the-wind hypothesis. 
The coefficients on broad currency index 𝑏2 are negative and significant for high 
intervention, and are positive and significant for low intervention at 5% level in the Tobit 
model with covariate dependent thresholds, as the 95% intervals for broad currency index 
variables do not include zero. The broad currency index reflects the foreign exchange market 
conditions. Evidence shows that poor (good) foreign exchange market conditions would 
trigger Daily Price high (low) intervention by the PBOC. Through the use of Daily Price 
intervention, the PBOC makes efforts to improve foreign exchange market conditions. 
Results in the Bayes Tobit model indicate that China’s macro economy has negatively 
significant effect on low intervention, but has no effect on high intervention. The yield curve 
spread is the proxy for China’s macro economy condition. Based on studies by Harvey 
(1988), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and Rudebusch and Williams (2009), the relation 
between the yield curve and the economy should be positive. The coefficients on the yield 
curve 𝑏3 are negatively significant for low intervention at 5% level. The low yield curve 
spread means that China’s macro economy condition is bad. Then, the RMB exchange rate 
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depreciates, reflecting the poor economic condition. Low intervention is used to offset the 
depreciation of the RMB exchange rate. Therefore, the low yield curve spread triggers 
intervention. 
Referring to the magnitude of determinant coefficients in Table 8, the numbers for the 
yield curve spread for both high (0.017) and low (-0.017) interventions are smallest. The 
difference between numbers for the yield curve spread variables and other variables shows 
that the yield curve spread represents the least important factor in the PBOC’s intervention 
decision. The broad currency index is the most important factor. 
 
Table 7 
Tobit model results with covariate dependent thresholds for whole period. 
Full sample: 22/07/2005-22/07/2013 
 High intervention Low intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 26.92 3.298 (20.50,33.36) -40.65 4.082 (-48.74,-32.72) 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 -12.85 3.636 (-20.12,-5.79) 6.242 1.781 (2.755,9.727) 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 -13.40 1.660 (-16.63,-10.16) 20.092 2.047 (16.12,24.14) 
𝑌𝐶𝑡 0.017 0.048 (-0.078,0.11) -0.225 0.060 (-0.34,-0.11) 
𝜏2  0.981 0.054 (0.882,1.091) 1.320 0.089 (1.16,1.51) 
Note: 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 is the bank RMB exchange rate offers, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 is the broad currency index, 𝑌𝐶𝑡 is the yield curve 
spread. 
 
Table 8 
Marginal effects for the whole time period. 
Full sample: 22/07/2005-22/07/2013 
 High intervention Low intervention 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 -13.099*** 
(-3.534) 
4.729*** 
(3.505) 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 -13.660*** 15.221*** 
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(-8.072) (9.815) 
𝑌𝐶𝑡 0.017 
(0.354) 
-0.170*** 
(-3.750) 
Note: The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 is the bank 
RMB exchange rate offers, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 is the broad currency index, 𝑌𝐶𝑡 is the yield curve spread. 
 
4.3 Results for Subsamples: Before, During and After the Global Financial Crisis 
 
The results for the three subsamples are reported in Table 9. In the subsample models, 
as in the model for the whole sample, the initial 1,000 variates are discarded as the burn-in 
period and the subsequent 30,000 values are recorded to conduct an inference. The number of 
Daily Price interventions in subsample 1 is 606, among which 51.7% of high interventions 
and 26.3% of low interventions are censored. There are 367 observations for Daily Price 
intervention in subsample 2, in which 27.2% of high interventions and 52.8% of low 
interventions are censored. In subsample 3, the number of interventions is 594, in which 68.4% 
of high interventions and 23.4% of low interventions are censored. 
In subsample 1, 22
nd
 July 2005 to 14
th
 July 2008, only the broad currency index 
factors have significant impacts on high and low intervention, as the 95% credible intervals 
do not include zero. The broad currency index variables are negative and significant for both 
high and low intervention. These results indicate that when making intervention decisions the 
PBOC considers the foreign exchange market conditions; that is, the PBOC tries to improve 
poor foreign exchange market conditions. For the yield curve spread, the coefficient 𝑏3 is 
positive and significant for low intervention only. This suggests that the PBOC tries to cool 
down the overheating of economic growth by using low intervention. 
In the financial crisis period, which is subsample 2, the aim of Daily Price 
intervention is to keep the RMB following the US dollar. The exchange rate regime during 
the financial crisis was a pegging regime, and therefore the main objective of Daily Price 
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intervention was to stabilize the exchange rate movements. Therefore, the coefficients on 
broad currency index 𝑏2 are significant on both high and low intervention. The bank 
exchange rate offers variable influences high intervention only. The coefficient on the bank 
exchange rate offers 𝑏1 is negative for high intervention. As with the result for subsample 1, 
the PBOC did use leaning-against-the-wind intervention. With regard to the yield curve 
spread, the coefficient on the yield curve spread 𝑏3 is negative and significant for low 
intervention. This suggests that in order to turn the economy from bad to good, the Chinese 
monetary authorities use low intervention, because low intervention can boost the import 
volume. 
For subsample 3, all determinant factors, except yield curve spread, have significant 
impact on high and low intervention, as the 95% credible intervals do not include zero. The 
coefficient on exchange rate offers 𝑏1 is negatively and positively significant for high and 
low intervention respectively. Similar to the result for the whole sample, this suggests that the 
PBOC uses leaning-against-the-wind intervention, and wants the RMB exchange rate to be 
impacted more by market conditions. Both high and low intervention decisions consider the 
foreign exchange market condition. The negative and positive significances of the coefficient 
on the broad currency index 𝑏2 for the low and high intervention are at 5% level, respectively. 
For the yield curve spread, the coefficients 𝑏3 are positive and significant for high 
intervention, but not significant for low intervention. This means that the PBOC tries to boost 
economic growth through high intervention, because high intervention can boost the export 
volume. 
According to the significance and magnitude of variables (Table 10) in these three 
subsamples, we find that the main objective of the Daily Price intervention is different in 
each case. For high intervention, the main objective across the subsamples is to focus on 
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market exchange rate condition. For low intervention, the main objective before the financial 
crisis is to prevent the domestic economy overheating, while during and after the financial 
crisis the focus is upon market exchange rate condition. 
 
Table 9 (1) 
Results of Bayes Tobit models for subsample 1 (22/07/2005-14/07/2008). 
 High Intervention Low Intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 17.785 5.491 (7.115,28.661) 30.600 11.279 (9.272,53.335) 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 -2.893 5.096 (-12.963,7.005) 8.067 9.452 (-10.514,26.745) 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 -8.638 2.753 (-14.093,-3.293) -16.006 5.683 (-27.456,-5.262) 
𝑌𝐶𝑡 -0.087 0.070 (-0.224,0.052) 0.747 0.164 (0.439,1.088) 
𝜏2  0.763 0.064 (0.649,0.897) 1.685 0.209 (1.321,2.137) 
Note: 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 is the bank RMB exchange rate offers, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 is the broad currency index, 𝑌𝐶𝑡 is the yield curve 
spread. 
 
Table 9 (2) 
Results of Tobit-GARCH models for subsample 2 (15/07/2008-22/06/2010). 
 High Intervention Low Intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 53.625 13.808 (27.883,82.054) -52.492 4.156 (-60.895,-44.528) 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 -40.742 21.409 (-84.215,-0.390) 9.110 6.023 (-2.616,21.037) 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 -27.208 6.915 (-41.483,-14.366) 26.440 2.070 (22.485,30.632) 
𝑌𝐶𝑡 0.079 0.170 (-0.249,0.419) -0.457 0.052 (-0.561,-0.356) 
𝜏2  2.264 0.414 (1.580,3.195) 0.469 0.047 (0.386,0.569) 
Note: 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 is the bank RMB exchange rate offers, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 is the broad currency index, 𝑌𝐶𝑡 is the yield curve 
spread. 
 
Table 9 (3) 
27 
 
Results of Bayes Tobit models for subsample 3 (23/06/2010-22/07/2013). 
 High Intervention Low Intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 53.954 6.527 (41.343,67.018) -69.18 14.984 (-99.684,-40.761) 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 -7.844 3.783 (-15.884,-1.405) 5.423 2.234 (1.075,9.817) 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 -27.193 3.281 (-33.767,-20.851) 34.15 7.504 (19.896,49.428) 
𝑌𝐶𝑡 0.665 0.104 (0.465,0.873) -0.0002 0.216 (-0.422,0.422) 
𝜏2  0.731 0.60 (0.625,0.858) 1.853 0.245 (1.432,2.393) 
Note: 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 is the bank RMB exchange rate offers, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 is the broad currency index, 𝑌𝐶𝑡 is the yield curve 
spread. 
 
Table 10 
Marginal effects for subsamples. 
 Subsample 1 (22/07/2005-
14/07/2008) 
Subsample 2 (15/07/2008-
22/06/2010) 
Subsample 3 (23/06/2010-
22/07/2013) 
 High 
intervention 
Low 
intervention 
High 
intervention 
Low 
intervention 
High 
intervention 
Low 
intervention 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 -3.792 
(-0.568) 
4.788 
(0.853) 
-21.163** 
(-1.903) 
19.424 
(1.513) 
-10.731** 
(-2.073) 
2.927** 
(2.427) 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 -11.321*** 
(-3.138) 
-9.499*** 
(-2.816) 
-12.018*** 
(-3.935) 
56.375*** 
(12.773) 
-37.200*** 
(-8.288) 
18.430*** 
(4.551) 
𝑌𝐶𝑡 -0.114 
(-1.243) 
0.443*** 
(4.555) 
0.035 
(0.465) 
-0.974*** 
(-8.788) 
0.910*** 
(6.394) 
-0.0001 
(-0.0009) 
Note: The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑡 is the bank 
RMB exchange rate offers, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡 is the broad currency index, 𝑌𝐶𝑡 is the yield curve spread. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper evaluates the influences that drive China’s central parity rate intervention 
in a Bayes Tobit approach. In order to estimate a proxy for Daily Price intervention data, we 
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use the present central parity rate and daily fair value CNY/USD exchange rate estimated 
following the IFV approach.  
In general, the results show that the bank RMB exchange rate offers, the broad 
currency index and the yield curve spread have significant effects on Daily Price intervention. 
The PBOC follows a leaning-against-the-wind policy by reverting to its bank exchange rate 
offers. In addition, both bad (good) foreign exchange market and macro economy condition 
can trigger high (low) intervention. 
With regard to the time-varying determinants of Daily Price intervention, results show 
that determinant factors vary not only between different subsamples, but also between the 
high and low interventions. We find evidence that across the different subsamples the main 
objective for high intervention is to focus on market exchange rate condition, while the main 
objective for low intervention ranges from restraining the domestic economy from 
overheating before the financial crisis, to a focus on market exchange rate condition during 
and after the financial crisis. 
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